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The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security
Abstract
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges and most pressing issues faced by
humanity in the modern era. Extreme weather events, changes to world ecosystems,
species extinction, disruption of animal and human migration, resource shortages, socioeconomic concerns, outbreaks and pandemics, as well as domestic and international
conflicts represent only a few select potential climate change consequences. Regrettably,
when considering the issues pertinent to climate change, one of the oft-overlooked areas is
cultural security. Rising sea levels will lead to some of the world’s islands and coastal cities
essentially being erased from Earth, resulting in the destruction, and possibly even the
disappearance, of their cultural heritage. Inhabitants of endangered and unlivable areas
are likely to drive mass exodus on a global scale, and forcibly displaced persons who find
themselves in a new socio-cultural reality face countless challenges that will hinder their
sense of cultural security. The most immediate concerns are related to the potential
eruption of local and regional conflicts, emergence of negative social behaviors,
disappearance of national language and cultural identity, and statelessness due to a loss of
habitable lands, all of which pose severe threats to cultural security.
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Introduction
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing humanity in the
21st century and it has already led to devastating environmental
consequences globally.1 Scientific evidence of climate change includes
increasing global temperature, rising sea levels, extreme weather events,
and ocean acidification, amongst many others.2 These negative
environmental outcomes have significant downstream effects on many
aspects of human life, which if not addressed, will ultimately lead to a loss
of security. Consequently, there are numerous publications, which explore
the relationship between climate change and human security. Many
content experts highlight that climate change, as it continues to worsen,
will progressively threaten human security by endangering cultures and
identities, negatively affecting the economy, and increasing forced
migration. 3 Some publications choose to focus on the environmental
consequences of climate change, drawing attention to the resultant
environmental degradation or the extreme weather events increasing in
both frequency and severity.4 Other studies take this one-step further into
the security arena and investigate the correlation between climate change
and violent conflicts, recognizing climate change as an exacerbating factor
in these conflicts.5 On the other hand, some take a different approach and
link climate change and its affects to broader areas of security, such as
national security and security policy development, or the direct and
indirect socio-economic consequences.6 However, only a handful of
available resources examine climate change from the cultural perspective,
but these largely ignore cultural security and focus mainly on sociocultural
issues, such as societal resilience, or the protection of tangible cultural
heritage. There is a notable insufficiency in the published research and
literature regarding cultural security, and consequently, the authors set
out to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the potential impacts of
climate change within the cultural security framework.
Cultural security refers to a protection of broadly defined culture,
including tangible cultural heritage (for example, cultural sites, objects,
and artwork) and non-tangible cultural legacy (for example, cultural
values, identity, language, religion).7 Importantly, cultural security
concerns cultural rights and freedoms, and relates to the protection of
cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities.8 Plausible downstream
consequences of climate change constitute a direct threat to cultural
1
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heritage and individuals, and therefore, their cultural security. Due to
rising sea levels, many low-lying states are in danger of complete
submersion. 9 In addition to the disappearance of these habitable lands,
both cultural sites and local populations, particularly indigenous
communities, are at risk as well. Additionally, certain regions may become
uninhabitable and contribute to the forced migration of individuals, and
concurrently, their cultures.10 This mass exodus of climate refugees will
lead to new and unplanned cross-cultural encounters, which can have
positive or negative consequences for both the incoming and domestic
cultural groups.11 Furthermore, unlivable lands and a resource scarcity due
to climate change may become a driving factor for regional instability,
terrorist activity, and outbreaks of conflict.12 Therefore, climate change
and its environmental consequences are a critical consideration for the
cultural security agenda. To address this deficiency gap, this article aims to
examine the correlation between climate change and cultural security by
exploring potential threats and describing the cultural consequences of
climate change’s impact.

Overview of Climate Change
Throughout its 4.5 billion year history, planet Earth has experienced
fluctuations between ice-age cycles alternating with warmer interglacial
periods, during which, the average global temperature and levels of
atmospheric carbon dioxide, methane, and other heat-trapping
greenhouse gases have varied greatly.13 Life began to evolve along with the
planet approximately 800 million years after its formation, which
ultimately led to the evolution of the first Hominids around 4.4 million
years ago.14 Several million years later, about 70,000 years ago,
descendants of these early Hominids known as Homo sapiens, began to
leave Africa and spread throughout the rest of the world. Similar to all
other mammalian lifeforms, they maintained a minimal and local effect on
plant and animal life, with no impact on the global environment or
climate.15 This changed, however, beginning in the late 18th century, when
the Industrial Revolution ushered in a new era of widespread automation
and the use of machinery, often powered with the burning of fossil fuels.
Consequently, it led to a global rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide and
other heat-trapping greenhouse gases. This global rise in atmospheric
greenhouse gases has since continued to intensify. Related climate
research accumulated over the past several decades has made it clear that
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human activity and industrialization contribute significantly to global
climate change, as well as the related ongoing mass extinction of plant and
animal species.16
Despite this knowledge, however, global greenhouse gas emissions
continue to increase, and the long-term outlook is concerning. According
to content experts from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
it is highly likely that human activity will be the dominant factor
contributing to climate change in the 21st century.17 There is already a
growing body of evidence supporting this projection. In the modern era of
rapid technological advancement and increasing urbanization, greenhouse
gas emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide,
have increased significantly due to human activity, which subsequently
contributes to global warming.18
One of the observable indicators of this change is an accelerating increase
of the average global temperature. The annual global average temperature
has increased approximately 1.1 degrees Celsius since the beginning of the
20th century, and recent projections predict an increase to 3.2 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels by the year 2100. Since climate record
keeping began in 1850, the five-year period of 2015-2019 has been the
warmest such period in history and the year 2016 was the hottest year on
record.19 Consequently, increasing global temperature results in sea level
rise, warming of land and ocean surfaces, shrinking glacial covers and ice
sheets, melting sea ice in the Arctic and Antarctic, and shifting of the
seasons.
Over the last several decades, the global sea level increase has been
accelerating rapidly, reaching its highest peak during the most recent
measurement in 2018.20 In addition, a study done at Oxford University
found that oceanic waters have absorbed more than 90 percent of heat
gained by the planet between 1971-2010 and average ocean temperatures
have risen by approximately 0.25 degrees Celsius throughout this same
period.21 Moreover, the largest glaciers in the world continue to retreat
rapidly, as areas such as Greenland and Antarctica, lose billions of tons of
ice each year.22 In many locations around the world, changes to season
cycles are observable. Winters are shorter with less sub-freezing days, the
spring season arrives earlier, and summer periods are increasingly hotter,
all of which can adversely affect agricultural and environmental cycles,
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including local vegetation, animals, and crops.23 Another visible effect of
global climate change is pertinent to the increasing frequency and
occurrence of extreme weather events, such as severe hurricanes and
cyclones, violent tornadoes, and intense tropical storms, which cause
significant impacts worldwide.24
Finally, one other measurable indicator of climate change relates to ocean
acidification as the result of rising carbon dioxide emissions and
absorption by the ocean. Some reports show that the acidification level of
ocean waters has increased by approximately 30 percent since the start of
the Industrial Revolution.25 Worsening climate change and global
warming can lead to the appearance of natural disasters, which may
include prolonged drought episodes, severe floods, increasingly aggressive
wildfires, and dangerous tsunamis. For example, the early 21st century has
been one of the most severe long-term drought periods in the history of
the United States.26 Dry weather, persistent heat, and drought were major
contributing factors to the Amazon rainforest fires, deadly wildfires in
California, and the Australian bushfires of 2019.27 Concurrently, rising sea
levels secondary to climate change may lead to more destruction when
events such as tsunamis or inland floods inevitably occur. Furthermore,
approximately 44 percent of the world population lives within 93 miles of
the coast. As a consequence, some of the world’s coastal cities, nations,
and islands (for example, Venice, the Netherlands, the Maldives) are at
high risk of becoming submerged under water if climate change continues
to accelerate as the same rate.28
Consequently, these severe weather conditions can have an impact on food
and water security, as well as other resource availability and accessibility.
Drought or flood can considerably affect agricultural lands and field crops,
resulting in a shortage of drinkable water and food, leading to
malnutrition and even famine. Persistent hunger and deepening poverty,
along with other geographical changes, can lead to the spread of infectious
diseases, as well as outbreaks of epidemics and potentially even
pandemics, under certain conditions.29 Simultaneously, climate change
may lead to the reduction of global resources, resulting in local and
regional conflicts. A study published in 2019 found an estimated 3-20
percent increase in armed conflict risk over the previous century due to
climate change and scientists expect this number to increase dramatically
in coming years.30
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In addition to the submerging of entire regions caused by rising sea levels,
another reason for the expansion of uninhabitable areas across the world
could be due to the rise of the average temperature. Wet bulb temperature
(TW) measurements, which combine both heat and humidity to provide a
threshold above which a healthy human body is unable to cool itself by
sweating (>35 degrees Celsius), have already reached critical levels in
several regions by 2020. This indicates that some aspects of global
warming may be more advanced than originally feared, since climate
change models did not predict that TW would reach this threshold prior to
the mid-21st century.31
Because of both rising sea levels and increased temperatures, a loss of
habitable lands may result in endangerment or extinction of plant and
animal species, and further lead to both human and animal mass
migrations. This evacuation of endangered populations and a need for
global relocation may also contribute to the increased risk of international
conflict over remaining habitable regions.32 To conclude, climate change
and global warming have a significant impact on the planet’s ecosystems
and have the potential to affect the global security landscape increasingly
through both sociocultural and political transformation, as well as major
geographical and demographic changes.

Cultural Security
The relationship between culture and security has existed for millennia
and the history of humankind demonstrates numerous consequences of
cultural encounters. The development of culture and intergenerational
transmission of its values contributed to the building of nations and entire
civilizations.33 Conversely, conflicts that bred from inter-cultural
differences have repeatedly led to negative outcomes, including amongst
many
•
•
•
•

Insurgency (for example, Boko Haram activity in Nigeria);
Social and national movements (for example, Arab Spring);
Local and international conflicts (for example, Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict);
Military involvement and the outbreak of wars (for example,
Bosnian-Serbian War).34
5

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4

Despite the fact that this interplay between culture and security occurred
throughout most of recorded human history, the term cultural security has
only begun to appear in literature relatively recently.35 However, there is
no consensus amongst security scholars regarding how to define and
classify cultural security. Many contemporary security theorists regard
cultural security as a type of security, alongside economic, environmental,
ideological, information, military, political, and societal.36 Other security
experts emphasize the people-centered focus of cultural security, whether
on an individual or collective level, and thus, consider cultural security to
be a dimension of human security.37 Another group of scholars regards
cultural security as a component of the global competition for soft power.38
Most security specialists agree, however, regardless of their ontological
classification, that cultural security is pertinent to non-traditional security,
as opposed to traditional, state-centered security, which relates more
directly to military and economic power.39 The lack of academic consensus
and paucity of relevant literature highlights that cultural security is a
neglected concept and emphasizes the importance of further examination,
especially as it relates to rapidly evolving existential threat of climate
change.
Cultural security is a multidimensional concept and the perceptions of
cultural security differ across the world, as each state possesses its own set
of characteristics, environments, and unique historical experiences. In
addition, the definitions of cultural security vary depending on what
particular aspect a content expert chooses to emphasize. Many definitions
highlight the individual and collective dimensions of cultural security,
particularly the concept of identity.40
In Ukraine, for example, cultural security strongly correlates with the
protection of cultural, national, and political identity from external
influences. Therefore, cultural security integrates with information
security and relates to a set of political and normative actions to protect
Ukrainian culture and identity.41 Similarly, cultural identity plays a vital
role in indigenous communities. Cultural, intellectual, and spiritual
creations, known as Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Traditional Cultural
Expressions (TCEs), are not only reflections of indigenous cultural
heritage, but also crucial components of their community identity.42
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Therefore, the cultural security of indigenous populations refers to the
protection of TK and TCEs. These identity-related definitions also extend
to the protection of human and cultural rights, as well as one’s
sociocultural identity, which are the integral parts of human security.43
One example that reflects this approach to cultural security links to a
situation experienced in various regions of Africa. Many African nations
are facing numerous challenges, including food and water insecurity,
persistent poverty, outbreaks of epidemics, increased terrorist activity, and
the eruption of conflicts and civil wars, mainly due to scarcity of natural
resources.44 These severe events not only endanger local people’s
livelihoods, but also affect their cultures, cultural identities, and diversity,
making them prone and vulnerable to external influences and hindering
their cultural continuity.45 Consequently, cultural security closely
correlates with human security and the protection of local populations and
their cultures.
A separate, but overlapping, group of definitions extends the concept of
cultural security to the state level and associate cultural security with
national security. In this context, cultural security refers to state’s ability to
protect its cultural, and by extension, national heritage.46 Furthermore,
cultural security refers to an environment in which a society can freely
cultivate the values shaping its cultural, hence, national identity, while at
the same time remaining open to the experiences, influences, and cultural
achievements of other nations. In other words, it is the environment of
cultural equilibrium, which allows the freedom to cherish one’s own
culture and experience the richness of other cultures at the same time. 47
For example, experiences of annexations, wars, limited sovereignty, and
political disturbances shaped culture in the Republic of Poland. For these
reasons, cultural identity and national heritage, including symbolic
elements of culture, language, religious values, and historic remembrance,
are the prime concern of national interests and cultural security of
Poland.48
Another group of cultural security definitions emphasizes the importance
of wisely utilizing cultural heritage in order to achieve desirable results in
the international arena, which subsequently results in the strengthening of
national power.49 In this context, cultural heritage and achievement is a
valuable tool to utilize in the global competition for soft power. Soft power
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is a non-coercive form of power that a state uses as a means to influence
and shape the preferences of others through attractive cultural, political,
or ideological qualities in the realization of national interests.50 In the
People’s Republic of China, cultural security is a vital component of nontraditional national security and refers to the protection against spreading
globalization and the influences of Western culture. Simultaneously,
cultural security in China puts an emphasis not only on safeguarding
cultural values, but also on the promotion of local culture globally to
strengthen their international position and effectively compete for soft
power.51 Similarly, in South Korea and Japan, cultural security involves
efforts to promote Asian pop culture worldwide to increase cultural
attractiveness and the opportunity to compete for global soft power.52
Ultimately, cultural security refers to a broadly defined protection of
tangible (for example, cultural or historic sites, cultural objects, and
artwork) and non-tangible forms of culture (for example, cultural identity,
or symbolic values). Furthermore, cultural security relates to the
protection of human and cultural rights of both recipients and creators of
culture. Cultural security can also involve the provision of cultural
freedoms of thought, lifestyle, and liberty to fully enjoy cultural rights and
participate in cultural reality. Lastly, cultural security concerns cultural,
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other minorities fostering an environment
in which individuals experience a sense of cultural belonging and cultural
safety.53
Climate Change and Cultural Heritage
As described previously, climate change has the potential to affect human
populations considerably and therefore, their cultural security, by
inducing a wide variety of physical and sociocultural changes. At their
2005 convention, the World Heritage Center administered a global survey,
asking participating states to describe the impact of climate change on
their national cultural sites and heritage. Out of 110 responses submitted
by 83 participants, 72 percent stated that climate change has affected their
natural and cultural heritage.54
One major threat to cultural security is the loss or destruction of habitable
lands due to severe weather events, such as floods or droughts, as well as
increasing temperatures, which can result in the disappearance of cultural
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heritage or unique historic sites. One such endangered city is Venice, Italy,
a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) World Heritage Site, which attracts millions of international
tourists annually.55 Climate change, along with inadequate infrastructure
and improper management of an increasing number of tourists,
contributes to both the flooding and structural damage of this cultural and
touristic landmark. While Venice has always been sensitive to changes in
water level due to its location, the frequency and severity of flooding has
increased in recent years due to globally rising sea levels and changes in
annual weather patterns.56 Another example of a coastal city at risk is the
ancient city of Alexandria, Egypt, which is on trajectory to submerge
underwater by the year 2050 if climate change and subsequent sea level
rise continues at its current rate.57 Not only is Alexandria a culturally and
historically rich site, but also a regional economic center and one of
Egypt’s most populous cities. It is important to highlight that ancient
buildings were constructed to withstand the elements of a specific local
climate, so building materials may not be able to survive a change in
weather conditions.58 The disappearance of these coastal cities would not
only adversely influence tourism but also damage national and global
sociocultural heritage and have long-term negative economic
consequences.
Another cultural security concern pertinent to climate change is
deforestation, caused either by severe weather events, such as wildfires, or
due to human activity. Deforestation also leads to an increase in average
global temperature, contributing to climate change and subsequent further
deforestation, a cycle that continues with increasing intensity.59 One of the
large-scale example is the Amazonian rainforest basin, which includes
significant regions of Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, as well as parts of several other
countries and is home to thousands of indigenous communities.60
Deforestation results in the loss of territory and access to resources, all of
which are fundamental to indigenous cultural identity. The loss of
ancestral land poses a major threat, not only to the well-being and lives of
indigenous populations, but also to the preservation of their unique
cultures, knowledge, and languages.61
Language is not only a utility communication tool, but it also allows
speakers to express, create, and embrace their cultural reality.62 Language
is uniquely important for indigenous populations, as it forms concurrently
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with their specific culture and allows for the preservation and
transmission of cultural values and knowledge from one generation to
another.63 Presently, many indigenous languages are disappearing at an
alarming rate and others are in danger of extinction.64 According to data
from UNESCO's Atlas of World Languages in Danger, the Amazon
rainforest basin is home to over 400 vulnerable or endangered languages
(approximately 20 percent of the global total), and 30 more have already
been lost permanently.65 However, not only do the indigenous
communities suffer because of these losses, but humanity as a whole
suffers. Language is not only a product of the cultures and communities
that have developed it, but also conversely shapes the worldview and
cultural framework for critical thinking and problem solving distinctly
unique to those who are native speakers. Therefore, when a language is
permanently lost, ancient knowledge, cultural heritage, and an entire
sense of community are lost along with it.66
Climate Change and Conflicts
Over the last 30 years, approximately 18 violent conflicts have been
associated with natural resources, as well as almost half of all civil wars
since 1960.67 However, while recent research has shown that climate
change may increase the risk of violent conflict, including organized armed
conflict and terrorism, there is no strong consensus amongst content
experts as to how significant that increase will be.68 Nonetheless, the
expansion of unlivable regions has the potential to exacerbate regional
conflicts, cause instability, and increase international confrontations over
habitable areas, agricultural lands, and natural resources, particularly
potable water. Thus, conflicts may arise in a situation where the supply of
resources including croplands, forests, fisheries, marinas, and water is
insufficient to meet the demand. Developing nations are particularly at
risk of conflict and economic damage caused by these resource
deficiencies, as agriculture and farming account for almost 65 percent of
their Gross Domestic Product, on average.69 Ineffective governance,
inadequate management of natural resources, and lack of environmental
protections are also contributing factors towards conflict eruption.
Moreover, competition to control access to renewable resources may lead
to exploitation by armed groups and terrorist organizations. 70 There have
been several case studies linking climate change to violent conflicts,
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fragility, livelihood insecurity, urban violence, and competition for scarce
environmental resources.71 Some recent examples include
•

•
•

•

The terrorist activity of Boko Haram around Lake Chad, an
important source of water for millions, which has shrunk by over 90
percent in the last 60 years;
The Islamic State and civil war in Syria exacerbated by conflicts
over access to water resources after severe drought in 2011;
The Taliban and other insurgent driven criminal networks in
Afghanistan organized around access to dwindling natural
resources and opium; and
The organized crime gang activity in Guatemala, which is thriving
due to the downstream economic effects of increasingly severe
natural disasters and extreme weather events.72

The World Resources Institute anticipates the risk of water-related
conflicts to rise across Africa, the Middle East, as well as South and
Southeast Asia in the near future.73 In the recent years, researchers
examining the relationship between temperature rise and violence
concluded that approximately every 0.3 degrees Celsius of warming
correlates with a 10 to 20 percent increase in the likelihood of armed
conflicts.74 Another group of researchers analyzing armed conflicts in the
context of climate change found that 23 percent of conflicts in countries
with ethnically diverse populations started in months marked by
significant weather-related disasters.75 While climate change may not
always be a direct trigger or primary cause for conflict eruption, it is likely
to become a threat multiplier that can eventually lead to resource scarcity
and increase the risk of conflict escalation further downstream.76
Nevertheless, any significant conflict poses a serious threat to cultural
security. Violent discord has a direct effect on the environment, local
ecosystems, and other protected areas, as well as downstream effects on
the health, cultural rights, sociocultural capital, and heritage of local
populations. One global research organization conducted a study, which
found that 32 states globally face extreme risk of conflict eruption or civil
war due to worsening climate over the next 30 years.77 This can lead to the
destruction of historical or cultural landmarks, monuments, sculptures,
and natural sites (for example national parks, natural wonders), which is
an important consideration when examining climate change-induced
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conflicts. Wartime also extends to the treatment of works of art within the
conflict zones. For example, during the Second World War, soldiers
notably plundered artwork, as well as destroyed historic and cultural sites
for strategic combat purposes.78 During this time, a great number of
cultural artifacts, antiques, paintings, and other notable works of art went
missing, due to large-scale looting, vandalism, destruction, and
exploitation.79 While numerous laws and international regulations
currently exist to protect cultural heritage worldwide, many cultural and
historic sites do not survive protracted conflicts.80 One recent example is
the Islamic State’s successful destruction and trafficking of ancient
landmarks and artifacts from sites in Iraq and Syria to fund the militant
group’s activities.81 As climate change continues to worsen, potentially
leading to frequent outbreaks of conflict, many experts raise concerns
about the continued development of similar practices and a growing
underground transnational art crime network.82
Climate Change and Migration
Due to an increasing average global temperature, many regions will
become unlivable, forcing millions of citizens and residents to flee their
homelands and seek refuge in areas that are better suited for living.83 The
World Bank estimates that regions of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and Southeast Asia will generate 143 million more climate migrants by
2050.84 Although reported cases of climate-induced migration have been
limited thus far, unchecked climate change will likely lead to an increase in
mass migration.85
Large-scale human migration results in the concurrent migration of a
population’s cultures, languages, ideologies, and religious beliefs.86
Contact between two or more distinct cultures can lead to both positive
and negative outcomes.87 An example of a positive outcome would be the
successful and balanced adaptation to a new reality. In this scenario, an
individual would continue to practice their own cultural habits and beliefs
freely, while fostering a respectful attitude and openness towards the new,
unknown culture and its representatives. In 2015, The European
Commission administered a survey to citizens of participating states,
asking to what extent they consider themselves a citizen of European
Union (EU). About 60 percent of respondents defined themselves as both
Europeans and nationals of their country of origin.88 These results imply
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that individuals demonstrate a positive attitude towards other cultures
while remaining attached to their national cultures.89 On the other hand,
negative outcomes could emerge, including a disregard or loss of one’s
own culture, disdain for a new locally imposed culture, and increased
tension between individuals from host states and newcomers, or even
potential conflicts between cultural groups.90 Therefore, this can
eventually lead to the emergence of negative social attitudes, including,
amongst many, anomies, intolerance, and various forms of discrimination,
denationalization, nationalism, and xenophobia.91 Furthermore, these
negative experiences may contribute to the deepening of social inequalities
and differences, often causing social unrest and cultural discontinuity,
which can eventually result in cultural insecurity.92 It is noteworthy that in
recent years there appears to be a decline in worldwide interest to
welcome migrants from or into certain countries.93 Therefore, the societal
discontent regarding an uncontrolled influx of foreigners, may be an
exacerbating factor in emergence of negative feelings towards newcomers
and their cultures, regardless of the reasons for migration.
Climate-induced migration can also adversely affect cultural security
through the processes of forced integration, assimilation, and cultural
adaptation. Climate change contributes to the expansion of unlivable
lands, leading to mass evacuation and the forcible relocation of affected
populations. This raises questions regarding effective integration policies
and the overall preparedness of receptive states to accept a large number
of climate refugees from different cultural backgrounds.94 Mass migration
produces different reactions amongst diverse populations, and often
triggers debate regarding state immigration processes, requirements for
receiving members of foreign states, and conditions that newcomers must
meet in order to become full members of the hosting society.95 One of the
overarching concerns regarding mass migration is how to ensure that
individuals coming from diverse cultural backgrounds, especially those
with opposing cultural identities, succeed in their new environment
culturally, economically, and socially. A recent example of mass migration
includes exodus of African and Middle Eastern refugees fleeing conflicts,
exacerbated by climate change, to the EU. Many of these migrants came
from conservative Islamic cultures, which sparked new debates around the
compatibility of their values with those of host states.96 Ultimately, this
forced integration led to a reactionary rise in support of far-right
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nationalist political parties and, furthermore, the creation of the Identity
and Democracy far-right political bloc in the European Parliament.97
Other fundamental questions emerge regarding protection of both the
human and cultural rights of minority groups. The host state’s role is to
create an environment in which individuals can succeed and experience
cultural freedoms without fear of expressing their own cultural identities.
Therefore, these more stable host states must take responsibility for
safeguarding cultures, cultural identities, and rights of newly arrived
minority representatives. The inability of a state to relocate newcomers
successfully and effectively, results in the formation of new densely
populated areas, such as refugee camps where individuals wait for further
relocation, oftentimes in poor living conditions. 98 Consequently, these
persistently overcrowded areas become increasingly dangerous, posing
considerable threats to the overall security of refugees and cultural
minorities coming from distant geographical locations. In addition, the
accumulation of large groups of people may affect their physical and
mental well-being, and contribute to increased social discontent and
anxiety, eruption of conflicts, or even leave these populations vulnerable to
outbreaks of violence or disease.99 Conversely, when a large number of
newcomers arrive into a country, there is a risk of the emergence of
cultural enclaves, where individuals do not attempt to integrate with local
society, often due to lack of opportunity or insurmountable sociocultural
barriers. On a larger scale, this practice can create tensions or conflicts
over cultural differences, which may eventually lead to outbursts of
violence or even hate crimes.100
Climate Change and Statelessness
The term stateless describes individuals who are not considered citizens or
nationals by any state under the operations of its law. 101 The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are
approximately 4.2 million stateless persons around the world, although
given the lack of data availability and reliability in some instances, this
number may be much higher.102 The issue of statelessness is broad and can
include individuals who formally hold a nationality, but cannot turn to the
state for protection, because of their immigration status or due to an
ineffective or corrupt system. 103 Statelessness violates a universal human
right to nationality and prevents individuals from enjoying their basic
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human and cultural rights. This is due to the lack of fundamental political,
cultural, and social freedoms typically provided by the government and
administration of a properly functioning state.104 One ongoing example is
the nomadic Muslim tribes of Northern Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia,
who have lived throughout these remote regions spread over multiple state
lines long before colonial borders were drawn. These minority groups have
suffered discrimination for decades in relation to their rights of citizenship
and basic identity documents, leaving them stateless and without the
fundamental economic, political, or sociocultural rights.105 In addition, a
lack of nationality, documented immigration status, or citizenship may
negatively affect one’s sense of sociocultural belonging and cultural
identity. This inability to develop sociocultural bonds may lead to social
exclusion, alienation, and finally loss of identity that is necessary to be a
full member of society.106 While statelessness is already a focus area of
many organizations, it is noteworthy that it closely relates to cultural
security as well, as it frequently concerns members of various ethnic,
cultural, or religious minorities, including indigenous groups.107
Statelessness can occasionally take even more extreme forms and escalate
to physical violence. One example that accurately reflects these severe
consequences of statelessness is the situation of the Muslim Rohingya
cultural and religious minority in Myanmar. In the recent years, the
Myanmar government has declined to recognize Rohingyas as a legal
minority, depriving them of rights to citizenship, and in result, leaving the
Rohingya people stateless. Due to systematic oppression, increasing
brutality, and ethnic cleansing, thousands of surviving Rohingyas have had
to relocate internally or have fled Myanmar since 2017.108
Evidence of large-scale climate change-induced statelessness is thus far
limited. Nevertheless, progressing climate change is likely to increase the
number of stateless individuals globally, as the amount of habitable land
decreases while instances of climate-related conflicts and mass migration
increase. Notably, most recent examples of statelessness are mainly due to
violent conflicts in unstable regions or failed states and include conflicts in
Syria, Darfur, South Sudan, Iraq, and Rwanda.109 In addition, the
populations of low-lying states (for example, the Maldives, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands) may need to evacuate due to rising sea levels and the
possible submergence of their lands.110 While the loss of territory due to
land submersion is unlikely to occur before the end of the 21st century,
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extreme weather events will most likely continue to increase in
frequency.111 Therefore, these low-lying states are likely to become
uninhabitable before complete submersion of their lands, causing a large
number of people to experience statelessness for the first time.112

Conclusions
The aim of this article has been to provide a non-comprehensive overview
of how climate change can affect cultural security. Based on the literature
review performed to explore these topics, the authors have concluded that
climate change does pose a threat to many aspects of cultural security.
Climate change is an exacerbating factor in conflict eruption, and the
world is already witnessing competition for limited natural resources.
Inadequate access and scarcity of renewable resources indirectly
contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011 and disturbances
in Mali in 2019, and this will likely occur more frequently as climate
change worsens.113 As climate change continues to accelerate, it can
potentially lead to an increase in terrorist activity and the outbreak of
violent conflicts over habitable lands and renewable resources.114 These
conflicts put the livelihood of local inhabitants in danger and can
contribute to the devastation of important cultural and historic sites,
posing a major threat to cultural creations and local populations, and
hindering their cultural security. 115
Climate change will also likely continue to increase severe weather event
frequency and duration, putting many coastal historic and cultural sights
in danger of destruction. The World Heritage sites of the City of London
on the banks of the River Thames, as well as the historic center of 13th
century Cesky Krumlov town are both at risk of experiencing severe floods.
Tidal floods, from increasingly frequent high tides and rising sea levels,
also threaten Venice, Italy, an area historically prone to flooding due to its
sensitivity to small changes in water level.116 This could be a forewarning
as to what may happen to other at and below sea level regions around the
world, as the average global temperature increases further, if climate
change continues to worsen.
Indigenous communities are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate
change, as it can negatively affect their resilience and destroy the
sociocultural continuity of their communities. Consequently, climate
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change impacts can negatively affect their safety, cultural identities,
health, and economy.117 Members of indigenous communities are often the
most susceptible to cultural extinction due to living in remote locations,
dwindling populations, and lack of written records. This can lead to the
permanent loss of language, ancient knowledge, cultural heritage, and an
entire community along with it. Therefore, it is important to assist these
communities in their survival in the years to come, considering they have
not contributed towards climate change.
The findings that the authors present also suggest that climate change can
become a major driving factor for mass displacement due to the loss of
habitable lands, which can eventually lead to the disappearance of local
cultures and identities.118 Mass migration can subsequently contribute to
the development of negative social behaviors and attitudes between
climate refugees and host societies, who may fear for their cultural
integrity.119 This can further lead to political radicalization, polarization,
and even paralysis of the political system and democracy of the host
states.120 Large-scale migration, without adequate systems and processes
in place, can also create stateless individuals whose human and cultural
rights are in danger of violation. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees currently has a plan in place to end statelessness in Europe by
2024 but admits this is not feasible in other parts of the world without
significant international collaboration and capital investment.121 Finally,
the mass exodus of climate migrants can lead to an increased emergence of
refugee camps, which, along with other well-documented hazards, put
displaced populations at risk due to the aforementioned increase in
extreme weather conditions. For example, in 2018, several refugee camps
in Africa and Asia experienced the occurrence of severe weather events
that significantly affected and damaged camp areas.122
This literature review exploring the link between climate change and
cultural security presents only a narrow, yet important, view of relevant
issues. As climate change continues to worsen and the average global
temperature continues to rise, more threats to cultural security will begin
to emerge. Therefore, there is a need to continue to increase global
awareness regarding the importance of slowing and stopping climate
change, as well as the potential wide-reaching cultural consequences. It is
also essential for both state and nonstate actors to make significant efforts
in combating climate change and develop strategic imperatives with
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concrete action plans to address these potential threats to security.
However, without some significant renovation and reformation to the
modern liberal order and improvements in transnational cooperation, the
outlook is tenuous, at best. Even if states continue to implement the Paris
Agreement obligations diligently, which thus far, has not been the case, the
world will still experience a 3.2 degree Celsius temperature increase by the
end of this century.123 The potentially economically restrictive obligations
imposed on states participating in the Paris Agreement contributed to the
rise of nationalistic populism in some states. Therefore, it may be fruitful
to pursue further research regarding the reciprocal relationship between
the breakdown of neoliberalism and worsening climate change, and its
effects on different aspects of cultural security. Without any sort of
comprehensive, executable, and globally accepted action plan, the cultural
security of millions, especially populations that are already vulnerable,
remains at risk. Ultimately, climate change is a global crisis and thus
requires global solutions and actions to ensure stability of the global order.
Therefore, it is the hope of the authors that the information presented in
this article will lead to further discussion and research in this field, as well
as the development of relevant global strategies and policies to address
these issues before it becomes too late.
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